A tradeable permits market is said to be e¢cient when all a¤ected …rms trade permits until their marginal costs equal the market price. Detailed …rm-level data are generally required to perform such an e¢ciency test, yet such information is rarely available. If …rms face a declining target, however, and are allowed to bank permits, as has occured recently, aggregated data such as the evolution of the permits bank is su¢cient to test for either less than optimal market participation or the exercise of market power. An application to the U.S. sulfur dioxide emission permits market is provided.
Introduction
It is well known that in theory, a tradeable permits program can ration a given quantity of a resource (e.g., clean air, lead in gasoline, …sh, water, bus licenses, taxi medallions) at the least cost to society. The argument rests on the assumption that an e¢cient permits market will develop in which all a¤ected parties trade permits until their marginal costs equal the market permits price. Even if an active market for permits develops, however, when some …rms either do not fully participate in the market (due to, for example, signi…cant transaction costs, regulatory rulings, or information asymmetries) or able to exercise market power, this active market will fail to deliver the least-cost solution. 1 And because cost information at the …rm level is generally limited, as in any other market, it will be di¢cult to test whether or not the permits market is actually delivering the least-cost solution.
A salient example is the U.S. Acid Rain Program, for which recent studies have reached opposing conclusions regarding the performance of its sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) permits market. 2 On the one hand, based on price and quantity data from private transactions, Joskow et al. (1998) argued that by mid-1994 the SO 2 market has become reasonably "e¢cient" in the sense that there was a large and increasing volume of transactions taking place at a single price. 3 This trading activity was consistent with the signi…cant cost savings estimated by Ellerman et al. (2000) . On the other hand, Carlson et al. (2000) constructed econometric abatement cost estimates for each individual …rm in the program and used them to predict the outcome of an e¢cient market for the years 1995 and 1996. They found that the actual cost of compliance was not only more than 50% larger than the cost of their e¢cient market prediction, but it was also larger than the cost under no trading. They attributed these results to many …rms' reluctance to 1 An active market here is one characterized by signi…cant trading activity and no arbitrage opportunities. If no such market develops, total costs will be higher than the least-cost solution, by de…nition; except in extremely unlikely situations in which …rms are homogeneous or the regulator has su¢cient information to allocate permits in the least-cost manner. 2 The U.S. Acid Rain program calls for a 50% nationwide reduction in electric utilities' SO 2 emissions. In this particular program, permits are called allowances. See Ellerman et al. (2000) for more details. 3 Note that, because the authors restricted their analysis to trading activity, their de…nition of "e¢-ciency" is narrower than the de…nition used in this paper.
fully participate in the market because of poor incentives provided by existing utility price regulation. 4 Clearly, the above …ndings invite further investigation not only of the SO 2 program, but more generally, of alternative ways to test the e¢ciency of a tradeable permits market.
In this regard, an interesting aspect of the SO 2 program has not yet been explored that could shed light on this e¢ciency issue: as a result of a declining SO 2 permits cap …rms, have engaged not only in so-called spatial trading (trading between di¤erent entities within each period) but also in intertemporal trading, i.e., they are banking permits for future use. Because the evolution of a permits bank is closely related to the evolution of an exhaustible resource stock, 5 in this paper I draw upon both the literature on tradeable permits markets and the literature on exhaustible resources to ask whether the evolution of readily available (aggregate) data such as prices and the permits bank provide enough information to detect less than optimal market participation or the exercise of market power. 6 Although my motivation derives from the SO 2 market, the model developed in this paper and its implications apply more broadly to any tradeable permits market that faces a declining target and allows for banking, a possibility that is attracting attention as a way to gradually introduce new regulation or tighten existing regulation. 7 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and examines the performance of a permits market in which, for either regulatory or economic reasons, …rms do not bank permits but only trade permits spatially. Section 3 introduces a declining target and banking, and explores the e¤ect of non-participation in the market on the evolution of aggregate data such as the permits bank. Section 4 analyzes the evolution of prices and the permits bank for a dominant …rm with a competitive fringe. Section 5 applies the model to SO 2 market data. Final remarks are o¤ered in Section 6.
The model
For concreteness and consistency with the application in Section 5, the model that developed here focuses on an emission permits market, but it can easily be extended to any other permits market by simply relabeling the variables.
Variables
Consider an industry with a large number N of heterogeneous …rms whose emissions are regulated by a tradeable permits program (in the study of market power, I will assume that a large fraction of these …rms merge to become a von-Stackelberg-dominant producer). The regulator allocates a total of A(t) = P N i=1 a i (t) allowances (or permits) in period t, where a i (t) is …rm i's allocation at t (note that capital letter will denote industry or group-level variables and small letter will denote …rm-level variables). Individual and aggregate allocations, which can vary over time, are common knowledge.
Firms di¤er in their costs of abatement and unrestricted emissions (i.e., emissions that would have been observed in the absence of the permits program). For mathematical tractability, I assume that …rm i's abatement costs are given by
where q i (t) are emissions reduced at t, ® i > 0 is …rm i's private information, and¯¸1
(to ensure an interior solution) is common to all …rms and known to the regulator. 8 Note that letting¯vary across …rms adds generality to the model but makes it mathematically untractable. I discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption in a few places later in the paper and argue that results are not a¤ected by this assumption. Also, we can let ® i decrease over time For a given aggregate level of reduction Q(t), the industry least-cost reduction burden
where°=
s commonly assumed in the literature (e.g., Weitzman, 1974), this cost formulation supposes that the regulator has some notion about the shape of the aggregate cost function, but not enough to predict the market equilibrium price for a given level of aggregate reduction.
Firm i's unrestricted or counterfactual emissions are denoted by u i (t). Thus, …rm i's emissions at time t are e i (t) = u i (t) ¡ q i (t), and industry-level emissions are E(t) = P N i=1 e i (t). As with costs, I assume that the regulator (or analyst) has much better information at the aggregate than at the individual level (or that estimations at the aggregate level are more precise than at the individual level), so I assume that he knows
The above heterogeneity in costs and unrestricted emissions assures that many …rms must buy and sell permits in the market in order to minimize total compliance costs. Firm i's trading volume in period t is x i (t), which can be either positive or negative depending on whether the …rm is a net buyer (x i > 0) or net seller (x i < 0) of permits. Because the regulator directly observes …rm i's emissions e i (information that is also available to the analyst) and enforces full compliance, x i is known and equal to e i ¡ a i . Note that I simply de…ne trading volume as the di¤erence between emissions and allowance allocation, regardless of the number of market exchanges in which the …rm was actually at some known industry-wide rate ±¸0 as a result of an exogenous innovation trend, speci…cally ® i (t) = ® i (0)e ¡±t , without any change in the resolution of the model. 9 I discuss this assumption further in the numerical section.
engaged. I am solely interested in the …rm's …nal position in the market, whether as a net buyer or net seller.
A market without banking
Before introducing banking, let us consider the simplest case, in which the regulator does not allow …rms to bank permits for future use (alternatively, consider the allowance cap A(t) to be constant over time so there are no incentives for banking). When there is no banking, full compliance implies A(t) = E(t) for all t, so market e¢ciency, as de…ned above, requires (Montgomery, 1972 )
for all t, where Q(t) = U (t) ¡ A(t), C 0 (Q(t)) is obtained from (2), and P ¤ (t) denotes the "optimal" price of permits. Because°is not known with precision, however, we cannot be certain whether the observed market price P ± (t) is the e¢cient price or not (hereafter the superscript "±" will indicate the observed variable). Even if°is known,
is not a su¢cient condition for market e¢ciency. Although we can rule out the presence of market power, we can still have P ± = P ¤ with less than optimal market participation.
Market e¢ciency also requires a certain volume of trading. If x i (t) is the number of permits that …rm i trades during period t, full compliance requires
Thus, in an e¢cient market, …rm i's trading volume is
eplacing P ¤ (t) according to (2) and (3), the (optimal) individual and aggregate volumes of trading become, respectively,
where
Unlike price information, the actual or observed trading volume V ± (t) does convey enough information for the analyst to conclude whether or not the market is e¢cient. In fact, V ± (t) < V ¤ (t) whenever there is non-participation (Stavins, 1995; Montero, 1998) or market power (Hahn, 1984 
A market with banking
Let us consider the same N …rms, but in a market in which the regulator allows …rms to bank permits for future use. For the latter to actually happen, permits allocations must decrease over time (at least at a rate higher than the discount rate for some period of 10 Note that because a i (t) varies across …rms, V ¤ (t) cannot be estimated even if the correlation between u i and ® i is known. 11 As discussed by Ellerman et al. (2000, Appendix) for the case of unrestricted emissions, econometric methods can provide reasonably accurate estimations for aggregate variables but generally imprecise estimates for individual variables (i.e., ® i and u i ). Accounting for individual statistical errors in the estimation of V ¤ would lead to such a wide con…dence interval that contrasting V ± to V ¤ would be of little use. time). To simplify notation and follow the SO 2 program design, I let a H be the (high) per-period permits allocation of each …rm during the …rst T periods of the program and a L be the (low) per-period allocation thereafter, with a H À a L . Thus, the aggregate allocations during these two phases are A H = a H N and A L = a L N, respectively. 12 To simplify notation further without loss of generality, I assume that u i (t) remains constant over time, so I drop its time index.
The e¢cient solution
As in the static case, an e¢cient market with banking solves the following in…nite horizon intertemporal minimization problem (Rubin, 1996; Schennach, 2000) min
where r is the risk-free discount rate, B(t) is the stock (i.e., bank) of allowances at time t and the dot denotes a time derivative. Denoting by¸(t) and Á(t) the multiplier functions, the Hamiltonian for this problem can be written as
where C(Q(t)) is given by (2).
Necessary conditions for optimality include satisfaction of (7), (8), and
12 Alternatively, one can let (A H ¡ A L )T be the initial stock B(0) and A L be the annual allocation for every period. 13 See Kamien and Schwartz (1991) .
In addition, taking the derivative of (9) with respect to time yields
When B(t) > 0, Á(t) = 0 and marginal costs, and hence prices, follow Hotelling's rule, rising at the discount rate r (note that permits are "extracted" at zero cost).
Whether and when …rms will bank permits depends upon the allocation of permits, the evolution of marginal cost functions, and the discount rate. For example, a signi…cant reduction of the permits allocation in the future, as in the SO 2 program, will result in a banking period of some length ¿ (to be determined shortly): …rms bank permits during some period of time and gradually use them thereafter, until the bank expires at ¿ . After ¿ , …rms go back to the "market without banking" situation described above.
The full compliance condition establishes that the total number of permits allocated during the banking period [0; ¿] be equal to the emissions accumulated during such period, that is
At ¿ , the terminal condition E(¿ ) = A(¿ ) must also hold
From (12) we have that C 0 (Q(t)) = C 0 (Q(¿ ))e ¡r(¿ ¡t) when Á = 0. Then, using (2) and (14), we have that
15)
Substituting (15) into (13) and rearranging, we obtain the following expression that solves 14 Note that this condition is the exhaustion condition of the exhaustible resource literature.
where u = U=n. Thus, for known values of A H , A L , U ,¯, and r, (16) provides a unique solution ¿ ¤ , which in turn allows us to compute the e¢cient paths for prices and quantities during the banking period [0; ¿ ¤ ]. P ¤ (t) will increase at the interest rate starting from
will increase at the rate r=¯, starting from
From the latter we can also compute the optimal emission
, and the optimal banking path,
Because the evolutions of these two quantity variables are directly connected to Q(t) in what follows, I focus on Q(t).
The e¤ect of limited market participation
Having derived the aggregate behavior of an e¢cient market based on either data that are readily available (e.g., A H , A L ) or parameters that can be estimated with reasonable precision (e.g., U ,¯, and r), 15 one question remaining is whether we can detect less than optimal market participation by contrasting the observed paths of prices P ± (t) and quantities Q ± (t) with the optimal paths P ¤ (t) and Q ¤ (t). As in the non-banking case, P ± provides little information to answer such a question, not only because of uncertainty about°but also because arbitrageurs ensure that _ P ± =P ± = r in any active market. Conversely, the evolution of Q ± (or B ± ) can provide valuable information to detect suboptimal market participation.
To study the e¤ect of non-participation on Q(t), let us de…ne …rm j as a nonparticipant if it uses its own permits for compliance and discounts the future at some rate r j , which can be greater than, equal to, or lower than r. 16 In the extreme case, a …rm using r j = 1 (or su¢ciently large) will bank no permits, and q j (t) = u j ¡ a i (t) for all t.
This is a non-participating …rm that even fails to minimize costs intertemporally, given its own endowment of permits. In comparing Q ¤ with Q ± for a market with less than full participation, it is useful to split the analysis into two cases: (a) all non-participating …rms discount the future at some rate other than r, and (b) all non-participating …rms use r.
Consider …rst for case (a), without loss of generality, two non-participating …rms 1
and 2 with discount rates r 1 and r 2 . Since the optimization problem solved by either of these production …rms is similar to the optimization problem for the industry, the reduction path followed by a non-participating …rm j = 1; 2 is (superscript "n" stands for non-participation)
Note that ¿ j (u j ) is a decreasing function of u j , 17 so there may be high levels of u j for which ¿ j < T and for which the …rm does not bank any permits.
Since
where Q p is the total reduction from participating …rms (superscript "p" stands for participation in the market), when both r 1 and r 2 are either greater or smaller than r, it is immediate that Q ± (t) will always di¤er from Q ¤ (t). When r 1 < r < r 2 , _ Q ± (t)=Q ± (t) = r=1
7 Taking the total derivative of (18) with respect to u and rearranging yields (index j is omitted)
holds for all t. Let suppose that (20) holds for t, then from (17), we have that in t + ¢ (where ¢ is very small) q
Consequently, when r 1 < r < r 2 , Q ± will also di¤er from Q ¤ . 18 In sum, when all non-participating …rms discount the future at some rate di¤erent than r, the evolution of Q ± will di¤er from Q ¤ since the beginning of the banking program.
Consider now case (b). If r j = r for all j (where j still refers to a non-participating …rm), then _ Q ± =Q ± = r=¯for all t. Because we cannot a priori rule out q n j (0) = q ¤ j (0) for many combinations of u j and ® j , 19 Q ± and Q ¤ may in fact follow close paths during the early periods, at least, of the banking program. As the end of the e¢cient banking program ¿ ¤ is approached, Q ± could still follow Q ¤ if and only if ¿ j = ¿ ¤ for all j. Because of heterogeneity in …rms' unrestricted emissions, however, the latter is unlikely to happen.
In fact, when u i 6 = u k for all i = 1; :::; n and i 6 = k and ¿ i is the end of …rm i's (private) bank according to (18), the latter leads to
It is very unlikely, then, that the end of each non-participating …rm's bank will ever coincide with the end of the e¢cient banking program. If ¿ j > ¿ ¤ for at least one non-
If, on the other hand, ¿ j < ¿ ¤ for all j (i.e., 18 One might argue that a (sub-optimal) observed path can still follow the optimal path if we let¯s vary across …rms such that the rate r j =¯j for each non-participating …rm equals the aggregate rate "r=¯". Because this aggregate rate varies with time when¯s di¤er across …rms, however, it will also di¤er from r j =¯j.
19 This combination derives from setting
, then the end of the banking period for the group of participating …rms will be ¿ p > ¿ ¤ because average unrestricted emissions from the participating …rms are now lower than u. Consequently, we again have that
The results of cases (a) and (b) can be summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 1
The observed quantity path Q ± (t) during a banking period will always di¤er from the optimal path Q ¤ (t) if there exists at least one non-participating …rm j for which either r j 6 = r or u j 6 = u.
Because it is most unlikely that one or more non-participating …rms will have the same level of unrestricted emissions u, 20 Proposition 1 indicates that even if, on average, non-participating …rms do have unrestricted emissions equal to u, the e¤ects of their non-participation on the evolution of Q(t) do not cancel out. Thus, the evolution of Q(t)
provides su¢cient information to judge the overall market performance. Furthermore, if
we allow u i to vary over time and¯to vary across …rms, the range of possible values that ¿ j can take for each potential non-participating …rm will expand, making ¿ j and ¿ ¤ even more likely to di¤er.
A natural question that Proposition 1 raises for the case in which all non-participating …rms discount the future at r is whether di¤erences between Q ± (t) and Q ¤ (t) can be detected early in the banking program or only towards its end. This question is not irrelevant for a banking program that is expected to last many years, such as that for the SO 2 market. 21 In this regard, Appendix A establishes Proposition 2 If all non-participating …rms discount the future at r but there exists at least one non-participating …rm j for which u j 6 = u, then
Simply stated, Proposition 2 says that non-participation, if it exists at all, has an immediate e¤ect on the evolution of Q(t) and B(t), and therefore we would not need to collect data for the entire banking period before concluding about overall market performance. Figure 1 presents the e¢cient quantity path Q ¤ (t) (path A) and a hypothetical observed path Q ± (t) with non-participants discounting at r (path B). The end of the bank along the e¢cient path is ¿ ¤ , and the end of the bank for participating …rms is denoted by ¿ p , which can also be greater than or equal to ¿ ¤ . Non-participating …rms'
individual banks end anywhere between ¿ l and ¿ h (note that ¿ h can be greater than, equal to, or smaller than ¿ ¤ ). 22 Full compliance or exhaustion also requires that between 0 and ¿ h , the cumulative reduction along path A must equal the cumulative reduction along path B. During the …rst years and before ¿ l , both Q ¤ and Q ± will grow at the same rate r=¯. As some non-participants exhaust their individual banks, Q ± will start growing more slowly and will eventually cross Q ¤ before ¿ ¤ ; otherwise the compliance condition will not be satis…ed.
Before illustrating the e¤ect of non-participation on the equilibrium path with some numerical exercises based on data taken from the SO 2 permits market, I will examine in the next section another type of market imperfection that can also prevent a permits market from delivering the least-cost solution. We have already seen that the exercise of market power cannot be detected in a "static" context unless detailed cost information is obtained. I will next explore whether market power can be detected in a dynamic context.
Banking with market power
Consider now a market with banking in which there is a dominant …rm and a competitive fringe. 23 The dominant …rm acts as a von Stackelberg leader, and all …rms in the fringe have perfect foresight. Consequently, the dominant …rm's decision problem is to choose the price path along with its reduction (or emission) path that maximizes the net present value of its pro…ts, knowing that each …rm in the competitive fringe will take such a price path as given and that neither its bank nor the fringe's bank can go negative.
Although this problem has been solved already for a typical exhaustible resource 22 As explained in the Appendix A, if ¿ h < ¿ ¤ , then ¿ p > ¿ ¤ and Figure 1 will still apply after relabeling ¿ p for ¿ h and vice versa. 23 Based on the analysis of Lewis and Schmalensee (1980) for an oligopolistic market, considering two or more large …rms and a competitive fringe should not qualitatively alter the main result of this section.
under di¤erent set of assumptions (Salant, 1976; Gilbert, 1978; Newbery, 1981) , the proposed solutions do not immediately apply to a permits bank for several reasons.
First, extraction costs for permits are zero. Second, storage costs for permits are zero so speculators (and …rms in the fringe) will make sure that prices neither jump nor grow at a rate higher than r. This also enables the dominant …rm to buy permits from the fringe and store them for future use at no cost other than the opportunity cost of selling them earlier. Third, in a permits market, the dominant producer can still exercise market power after its stock (i.e., bank) and that of the fringe have been exhausted. So, contrary to what would occur in a typical exhaustible resource market, the dominant …rm may still use its strategic position of the end of the banking period to exercise some market power during the banking period even if it does not receive any permits from the stock (A H ¡ A L )T , but only an allocation ‡ow throughout. Fourth, because the demand for permits comes not from a third party (e.g., consumers) but internally from the fringe and the dominant producer, the dominant …rm's decision problem is the choice of not only a permits sale/purchase path (or a price path supported by a sales path), but also an abatement (or demand) path.
Rather than attempt a complete characterization of equilibrium paths for any possible permits allocation and cost structure, 24 I shall describe the equilibrium path for what seems to be the most general case. Let f index the competitive fringe and m represent the dominant producer. Abatement costs are as before, so the fringe and leader's cost
permits allocations are also as before, although it is useful to make an arti…cial distinction here between stock and ‡ow allocations. 25 The total ‡ow (or per period) allocation is (2002) we consider other allocation, cost and commitment structures. For instance, we consider a dominant …rm (possibly a broker) that holds a large part of the permits stock but does not pollute. 25 The stock is the cumulative number of permits allocated above the long-term goal of A L .
the end of the banking period.
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Let us …rst consider the case in which ¹ = 0. Under this permits allocation, the fringe, on the one hand, does not build a bank on its own, but buys permits from the dominant producer since the …rst period. The dominant …rm, on the other hand, …nds it pro…table to build and manage a permits bank. Formally, the dominant …rm solves
s.t.
where X(t) is the number of permits sold by the dominant …rm during period t,
is the dominant …rm's bank, and¸m and Á m are multiplier functions.
Since …rms in the fringe are price takers, it is irrelevant whether the leader solves for P (t) or Q f (t). Replacing (23) and (24) in the objective function to form the corresponding Hamiltonian H(Q f ; Q m ), the necessary conditions for optimality include satisfaction of (23)-(27) and
From (28) and (29) we obtain 26 The same qualitative results apply if the dominant …rm is a monopsonist at the end of the banking period (the end or "choke" price will be lower than the competitive price). 27 If the dominant …rm acts as a monopsonist, then X(t) < 0.
Eq. (31) shows that if the strategy of the dominant …rm is optimal, the discounted value of marginal revenues, C 0 f ¡ C 00 f X, 28 minus marginal costs must be the same in all periods during which the dominant …rm sells (i.e., marginal revenues net of marginal costs must rise at the rate of interest). Furthermore, since the dominant …rm continues to enjoy market power after both its stock and the fringe's stock are consumed, marginal revenues must be equal to marginal costs in all periods. At the end of the banking period ¿ m , the "choke" price P m that prevails does not depend on the allocations before T , and can be readily estimated by solving (31) subject to (24) and
Since the dominant …rm is assumed to be a seller of permits in the long run we have
A characterization of the price path during the banking period can be obtained from (28). Taking the derivative with respect to time, letting _ m = 0, and rearranging yields
Because there are no storage costs, we already know that arbitrage prevents prices from increasing at any rate higher than the discount rate r; hence, _ Q f =Q f cannot be higher than r=¯. Using this and C f (Q f (t)) =°f [Q f (t)]¯+ 1 , it is not di¢cult to show that
which, in turn, implies that _ P =P < r. 29 Consistent with Salant (1976) and Newbery (1981), when the fringe has no stock left, it is optimal for the dominant producer to let prices rise at a rate strictly lower than the discount rate.
The quantity path, Q(t) = Q f (t) + Q m (t), can be derived from the price path, eq.
(31) and the exhaustion or full compliance conditions. From the price path and (31), we know that _ Q f =Q f < r=¯and _ Q m =Q m = r=¯, respectively. This implies that in the presence of market power, the observed quantity path Q ± (t) rises at a lower rate than does 28 Note that since C 00 f (Q f (t)) = @P (Q f (t))=@Q f (t), marginal revenues can be expressed as P (t) ¡ P 0 (X(t))X(t). 29 Note that if marginal cost curves are linear, i.e.,¯= 1, _ Q f =Q f = _ P =P and _ P =P = r=2.
the e¢cient quantity path Q ¤ (t). This result, together with the exhaustion conditions,
indicates that Q ± (t) must start above Q ¤ (t) and cross it from above at some later point to …nally converge to
Although driven by di¤erent reasons, the e¤ect of market power on Q(t) is qualitatively similar to the e¤ect of non-participation on Q(t) that is depicted in Figure 1 . Market power unambiguously prolongs the length of the banking period and increases the total cost of compliance.
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For this particular allocation of permits in which the fringe builds no stock, it is possible to detect the presence of market power by contrasting either Q ± (t) with Q ¤ (t)
or _ P ± =P ± with r (recall that absolute price levels do not say much because of limited cost information). However, the latter becomes unfeasible when the fringe holds a bank.
During the period in which the fringe's bank is positive, prices must rise at the interest rate; otherwise the fringe would not hold any permits.
Let us now consider the more general case in which the fringe holds a permits bank for some period of time. To make the case clear enough, let us assume that ¹ = 1, so the dominant …rm receives no stock. One can think of di¤erent candidates for the Stackelberg-rational expectations equilibrium. For example, the dominant …rm could propose a price path growing at a lower rate that would induce …rms in the fringe to sell all their stock as early as the …rst period. In the absence of binding contracts, however, this solution is time inconsistent, because as soon as the fringe's stock is exhausted, the dominant …rm will …nd it pro…table to revise its initial price path proposal and raise prices accordingly. Firms in the fringe will anticipate the price jump and hence hold onto their permits rather than sell them in the …rst place.
Since the dominant …rm receives no stock, another candidate is one in which the dominant …rm builds no bank and the fringe's bank expires at the choke price P m . If this were indeed the solution, market power could not be detected from either price or quantity data. Price would rise at the rate of interest during the entire banking period, and from the exhaustion conditions it is clear that the aggregate quantity path
would coincide with the competitive path Q ¤ (t). This solution cannot be an equilibrium either, because the dominant …rm sells permits before the end of the banking period. Since the dominant …rm has enough ‡exibility to support this price path through di¤erent sales paths (all yielding the same discounted sum of pro…ts of the fringe and the leader), it can certainly choose to accelerate the exhaustion of the fringe's bank by holding onto its permits and selling them only after the fringe bank has been exhausted at ¿ f < ¿ ¤ . At ¿ f , however, the dominant …rm would …nd its original proposal no longer optimal and would let prices rise (after a possible instantaneous jump)
at a rate strictly lower than r until they reach
Consequently, the equilibrium path must necessarily have the dominant …rm conserving enough permits to keep a stock that will consume and sell after all …rms in the fringe have exhausted theirs, regardless of how much it received of the stock (A H ¡ A L )T . Before providing the complete solution, the latter equilibrium condition gives us su¢cient information to depict typical equilibrium price and quantity paths, P ± (t) and Q ± (t), respectively. As shown in Figures 2 and 3 , there will be three distinctive phases. During phase A, P ± (t) rises at the interest rate r, and Q f (t) and Q m (t) rise at r=¯, as in the competitive case. While the fringe consumes its stock and the dominant …rms builds its own, it is not obvious whether the dominant …rm participates in the market during this phase (more on this below). At ¿ f , the fringe's bank is exhausted but the dominant …rm's bank is positive. Phases B and C are as before. In phase B, P ± (t) rises at a rate strictly lower than r, and Q ± (t) = Q f (t) + Q m (t) grows at a rate strictly lower than r=s ince Q f (t) follows the price path. Furthermore, from the full compliance (or exhaustion) condition, the observed path Q ± (t) crosses the competitive path Q ¤ (t) sometime during this phase. At ¿ m , the leader's bank is exhausted, after which prices remain constant at
Because quantity data allow us to detect market power even when prices rise at rate r during phase A, the results of this section can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In the presence of market power, Q ± (t) 6 = Q ¤ (t), regardless of the allocation of the permits stock, i.e., (A H ¡ A L )T . More speci…cally, Q ± (0) > Q ¤ (0) and
Although Proposition 3 establishes that market power will immediately a¤ect the quantity path (which answers one central question of this paper), it does not say much about the di¤erence in magnitude between Q ± (t) and Q ¤ (t) for a given permits allocation (µ and ¹) and cost structure (°f and°m). For that we must derive the complete equilibrium solution. In particular, we need to determine ¿ f and ¿ m .
The solution must not only be time consistent and exhibit the market power of the dominant …rm after the fringe's bank has expired, but one can argue that it should also make some use of the ability of the dominant …rm to alter the stock of the fringe during the competitive phase (phase A) by either selling or buying permits. In the absence of binding contracts, however, the latter possibility will be time inconsistent in the sense that the dominant …rm would continuously like to revise its original price path after each transaction. 31 To overcome these objections and still allow the dominant …rm to be more active during the competitive phase, Newbery (1981) argued that the NashCournot equilibrium appears to be the best approximation to the rational expectations Stackelberg equilibrium. 32 In our context, however, such an approximation looks less attractive to the leader, since in a permits market where there is no third-party demand, the Nash-Cournot equilibrium coincides with the Nash bargaining solution (Spulber, 1989) 
Hence, the more reasonable solution is for the dominant …rm to refrain from any permits transaction during the competitive phase and only start selling permits at ¿ f (the formal derivation of such an equilibrium solution can be found in Appendix B).
An application
The U.S. SO 2 trading program is a natural candidate for demonstrating the application of the model. Hence, the purpose of this section is not to present a formal e¢ciency test 31 Since the dominant …rm's optimal sale or purchase is a function of the fringe' stock, the ex-ante (i.e., before the transaction) optimal solution di¤ers from the ex-post optimal solution. The rational expectations Stackelberg equilibrium derived by Gilbert (1978) in his example does not have this time inconsistency problem because he uses a constant demand elasticity (besides equal discount rates and zero extraction costs), which is not our case. See Liski and Montero (2002) for more on this time inconsistency issue. 32 The Nash-Cournot equilibrium is also used by Salant (1976) .
for the actual evolution of the SO 2 bank, 33 but to illustrate the e¤ect of di¤erent forms of non-participation (or ine¢cient participation) on the evolution of prices and quantities and see whether it is possible to detect non-participation with some degree of con…dence.
Furthermore, because market power does not seem to be an issue in the SO 2 program, I
focus exclusively on the e¤ects of non-participation.
For the application, I use data from the 263 electric utility power plants a¤ected in both Phase I, which lasted for T = 5 years, and Phase II of the program, which is ongoing. The total number of permits (or allowances) allocated to all of these plants each year during Phase I was A H = 6:31 million and during Phase 2 was A L = 2:37 million.
Each permit gives its holder the right to emit one ton of SO 2 in a particular year. To allow for the possibility that a plant owner may partially participate in the market (i.e., engage in some trading activity, but not enough to equate marginal costs and prices), I
divide each of the 263 plants into smaller production units of roughly 100 MW each, Counterfactual emissions total U = 9:14 million tons. Cost parameters for each unit (® i ) are randomly assigned from a uniform distribution over the interval [0:002; 0:0002]. To be consistent with previous estimates, these numbers were chosen to produce an initial equilibrium price of about $260 and long-run (i.e., after the banking period) cost savings 33 A formal test would require an empirical estimate of several parameters including the discount rate. For more see Ellerman and Montero (2002) . 34 For example, a plant 430-MW plant is converted into 4 smaller units while a 670-MW plant is converted into 7 smaller units. Plant size ranges from 100 MW to 1500 MW. 35 For 21 units, I increased counterfactual emissions a bit further just to avoid corner solutions. On aggregate, this represents a less than 1% increase of counterfactual emissions. from trading on the order of 45%. In addition, I use convex marginal cost curves with = 1:5 (in order to avoid corner solutions) and a discount rate of r = 6%. To keep things simple, I assume that a …rm j that does not participate is one of three possible types, depending on its discount rate: (1) r j = r, (2) r j = r=2 and (3) r j À r (i.e., no banking).
Simulation results for relevant variables and di¤erent levels of market participation are in Table 2 . Since each market simulation randomly assigns to each unit a cost parameter Without any prior regarding the proportion of types among non-participants, the third row shows the e¤ects of a 25% non-participation rate, assuming that non-participation types are in equal proportions. While by the end of Phase I the actual bank B ± (T ) is only 5% smaller than B ¤ (T ), by the tenth year the actual bank B ± (10) is 18% larger than the e¢cient bank B ¤ (10); this result is comparable to the 18% long-run e¢ciency losses (i.e., higher costs C(¿ )) from less than optimal market participation. As shown in rows 4 and 5, these di¤erences between the actual bank path and the e¢cient path increase steadily as the participation rate falls.
The next seven rows (from 6 to 12) present results for a 75% participation rate and di¤erent combinations of non-participation types. Di¤erences in both the levels and the rates of change between the actual and the e¢cient bank path are always important, particularly as the bank is withdrawn. For instance, row 9 considers a proportion of nonparticipation types (3/4 of type 2 and 1/4 of type 3) such that B ± (T ) is almost equal to B ¤ (T ), but because the rate at which the e¢cient bank is withdrawn is higher than the rate at which the actual bank is withdrawn, B ± (10) is considerably larger than B ¤ (10).
Interestingly, when all non-participants discount the future at the market rate r (i.e., type 1), as in row 10, the di¤erences between the e¢cient and the actual path reduce signi…cantly, but not so fully as to prevent the detection of some market ine¢ciencies (B ± (10) is still 13% larger than B ¤ (10)).
Because actual and e¢cient paths di¤er at various point in time, precise knowledge of total unrestricted (or counterfactual) emissions, as we have assumed so far, is not crucial for the detection of non-participation, if it exists. Row 13 shows the e¢cient solution for a market in which total unrestricted emissions are assumed to be 10% higher than before (i.e., 10:05 million tons). 36 Thus, if we perform an e¢ciency test assuming incorrectly that total unrestricted emissions are 10:05 instead of 9:14, the e¤ect on B(t) of a 60% participation rate (with equal proportion of non-participation types) may not be detected easily at T , as shown in row 14. However, since an actual bank with partial participation and the e¢cient bank evolve at di¤erent rates, their paths will inevitably di¤er both before and after T . 37 This applies to di¤erent participation rates and to di¤erent proportions of non-participation types, as well.
Final Remarks
I have investigated the e¤ects of less than optimal market participation and of the exercise of market power on the equilibrium path of a permits market with banking. During the period in which …rms bank and withdraw permits from the bank (i.e., the banking period), the e¢cient price path follows Hotelling's rule, rising at the interest rate;
because of imperfect cost information, however, the actual price path does not provide enough information to detect either non-participation or market power (at least during the competitive phase). The e¢cient permits bank path, on the other hand, is unique and can be readily contrasted with the evolution of the actual bank. In the case of nonparticipation, this is possible because of heterogeneity across …rms (particularly in term of their counterfactual emissions). In the case of market power, this is possible because the dominant …rm always conserves a stock of permits after all …rms in the fringe have exhausted theirs. After that, the price path rises at a rate strictly lower than the interest rate until it reaches the static monopoly level.
In an e¤ort to contribute to the aforementioned debate about the performance of the permits market of the U.S. Acid Rain Program, I then applied the theoretical model to data obtained from the SO 2 permits program. Numerical exercises indicate that the levels of ine¢ciency (i.e., higher compliance costs) suggested by Carlson et al. (2000) can be supported only by a signi…cant degree of non-participation: about 50%, if we believe that non-participants use discount rates that are not necessarily equal to the market discount rate, as shown in row 4 of Table 2 . Furthermore, for this degree of non-participation, the evolution of the actual bank would di¤er noticeably from the evolution of the optimal bank; it would be 11% smaller by t = 5 (end of Phase 1) and 36% larger by t = 10 (see row 4). This departure from optimal banking is in sharp contrast with the empirical analysis of Ellerman and Montero (2002) , who found that the aggregate evolution of the SO 2 bank for the period 1995-2001 closely follows the evolution of an optimal bank.
[ 
A Proof of Proposition 3
I provide a general proof by considering two special cases: (1) two non-participating …rms 1 and 2, for which u 1 < u < u 2 ; and (2) one non-participating …rm j, for which u j 6 = u.
Case (1): There are only two non-participating …rms 1 and 2 for which u 1 < u < u 2 .
From (16) and (18) we have that
In addition, if we assume, for notational 38 we also have that ¿ 1 > ¿ p > ¿ 2 , where ¿ p is the end of the bank for the group of participating …rms.
Full compliance requires
Replacing
, where Q p is the total reduction from the group of participating …rms, (33) becomes (note that, to save on notation, I have made the time index a subscript for t = 0)
Developing (34), using each bank's terminal condition (see (14) 
Thus, the proof for case (1) would be complete if we can demonstrate that f(u 1 ; u 2 ) > 0.
Although the …rst two terms on the right-hand side (RHS) of (35) are positive, the third term is negative, so the sign of f(u 1 ; u 2 ) remains ambiguous.
I proceed the demonstration with a comparative static analysis by letting u 1 = u ¡ ¢ and u 2 = u + ¢, with ¢ su¢ciently small to use a second-order Taylor's approximation for f (u 1 ; u 2 ) around f (u; u), as follows 
where k is either 1 or 2.
Thus, we must now demonstrate that q n k0 is convex in u k . Since q n k0 = (u k ¡a L )e ¡r¿ k =¯, plugging the latter into (18) we obtain (hereafter I drop the indices k and n)
which, after total di¤erentiating by u, yields
To compute f 0 and f 00 , it is useful to write q 
43)
where x = ¢, y = ¡¢=(n ¡ 1), and ¿ (z = x; y) is obtained from
B The dominant …rm's solution
The solution of the dominant …rm is found by …rst imposing a continuous price path that ends at P m , the monopoly price that prevails when there is no bank left and which can be easily obtained from (31). From 0 to ¿ f (the time at which the fringe's bank is exhausted), _ P (t)=P (t) = r, and from ¿ f to ¿ m (the time at which the dominant …rm's bank is exhausted), _ P (t)=P (t) < r, according to (32). At ¿ m and afterward,
The rest of the solution (i.e., ¿ m and ¿ f ) is found by simultaneously solving the two "exhaustion" conditions: the fringe's bank expires at ¿ f and the dominant …rm's bank expires at ¿ m > ¿ f . Since the dominant …rm does not trade between 0 and ¿ f , these two conditions can be written as
where U f = U ¡ U m and µ and ¹ are, respectively, the proportion of ‡ow and stock permits allocated to the fringe.
The fringe's abatement path Q f (t) follows the price path according to C 0 f (Q f (t)) = P (t). The dominant …rm's abatement path Q m (t), on the other hand, must minimize the present value of the dominant …rm's compliance costs during the banking period; hence, it must grow at r=¯until it reaches its long-term level Q m m at ¿ m (this value can also be obtained from (31)). Substituting these abatement paths and the price path into (48) and (49), ¿ f and ¿ m are …nally found. 
